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The Federal Government and the
Promise of Brown
BRIAN K. LANDSBERG
University of the Pacific, Sacramento

The U.S. Depmtment of justice has played an important role in the development
and enforcement of school desegregation law, by participating in Brown and later
cases. From the Truman administration to the present, the thrust of government policy has been to promote unity and vindicate the unmet promise of the equal protection clause. The ambiguity of the Supreme Court's decision in Brown has allowed
considerable flexibility in defining and remedying discrimination. Whether Brown
failed or succeeded depends on which possible meaning of Brown one accepts. The
department now should protect the gains under Brown from retrogressive attacks
and should oppose resegregation.
Ten years ago, former U.S. Assistant Attorney General David L. Norman
spoke at an observance of Brown's thirtieth anniversary. He asked "whether
there is a growing subscription to an unwritten amendment to a familiar
principle: 'The amount of affirmative action, such as busing, required to
overcome the effects of past discrimination is inversely related to the
length of time which has elapsed since Brown. ' " 1 On this fortieth anniversary of Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, Kansas, signs of wea riness and
forgetfulness persist, but neither the federal government nor the courts
have yet succumbed. It is appropriate to retell the reasons for the federal
role in the Brown decision and its enforcement. The retelling should m ake
evident the importance of renewed vigor in federal support for the
promise of Brown.
During the pre-Brown era the federal government participated in racial
segregation in various ways, such as federal financial assistance for separate
schools, segregated public housing, and segregated programs for farmers.
However, President Truman recognized the harm that racial discrimination wreaked on the nation and bega n to ta ke steps to combat it. He
ordered the military to desegregate. He convened a conference on civil
rights. He strengthened fede ral equal employment opportunity efforts.
And he enlisted attorneys of the Department of Justice, who filed amicus
briefs attacking racially restrictive covenants, 2 segregated railroad dining
cars/ and segregated public graduate education. 4 T h e story is well known
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of their filing a n amicus brief in Brown v. Board of Education in December
1952, when President Truman was a lame duck president. 5 However, it is
worth recalling what the federal gove rnm ent was seeking in Brown.
The De partment of Justice's first brief in B-rown n o ted that the federal
gove rnm e nt has a "special responsibility for assuring vindication of the
fundame n tal c ivil rights guaranteed by the Constitution." 6 The brief
focused o n official race discrimination, observing that it "inevitably tend[s]
to undermine the foundations of a society dedicated to freedom, justice,
and equali ty." 7 Finally, the brief expressed concern that "the existence of
discrimination against min ority groups in th e United States has an adverse
e ffect upon our re lations with other co untries." 8 Thus, the main concern of
the federal government was not with private rights, but with natio n al unity,
enfo rcin g constitutional norms, and th e public interest. President Truman 's actio n s reflected understanding that th e racial caste system was
sh redding the fabric of national life.
We should recognize that these goals may not have been identical to the
goals of others invo lved in th e li tigation. Some may have sought ed ucati onal reform and understood that segregatio n was a fatal sh ortcoming of
American education in 1954. Others may have simply wanted to equalize
educatio n al opportunities. The government's goals had to do with unity
and vindicatio n of the unmet promise of the equal protection clause.
The United States in Brown argued that the plaintiffs could win without
overruling Plessy v. Ferguson, but that if the Court reached the issue, Plessy
should be overruled. Children do not enjoy equality when they "know that
because of th eir color the law sets them apart fro m o th ers, and requires
them to attend separate schools specially establish ed for members of their
race."9 The government concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the classification of students on the basis of race or color so as to deny
one group educational advan tages and opportunities afforded to
another."' 0 As to relief, the brief r ecommended that the Court remand to
the lower courts "with directions to devise and execute such program for
relief as appears most like ly to achieve orderly a nd expeditio us transition
to a non-segregated system."" Relief n eed not occur "for th wi th." As justification for this gradua l approach, the brief a rg ued that "[a] reasona ble
period of time will obviously be r equired to permit formulatio n of new provisions of law governing th e ad ministration of schools in areas affected by
the Court's decision."'2
Mter hearing initial arguments du ring its October 1952 term, the Court
set the case down for reargument in order to seek the views of the parties
as to questions pro pounded by the Court. It also requested a further brief
from the Eisenhower ad ministratio n. That brief addressed th e questio ns
the Court had asked a n d took no position o n the outcome, but at oral
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argument Assistant Attorney General Rankin said "it is the position of the
Department of Justice that segregation in public schools cannot be maintained under the Fourteenth Amendment, and we adhere to the views
expressed in the original brief of the Department in that regard."'' As to
relief, the United States noted the success of New Jersey in desegregating
its schools. It noted various issues of school administration that the state
would have to address. It assumed that neighborhood schools would be
permissible even if they were substantially of one race.•• It argued that
relief should be entered "as expeditiously as the particular circumstances
permit. " 15
After Brown I ruled for the plaintiffs, the government filed a brief in
B-rown II. In arguing that "the vindication of the constitutional rights
involved should be as prompt as feasible ," the Department of Justice
pointe d out that "the 'personal and present' right ... of a colored child
not to be segregated while attending public school is one which, if not
enforced while the child is of school age, loses its value."' 6 The federal government argued that the "right of children not to be segregated because of
race or color ... is a fundamental human right, supported by considerations of morality as well as law," and that "racial segregation affects the
hearts and minds of those who segregate as well as those who are segregated, and it is also detrimental to the community and the nation."' 7
Thus, in the Brown litigation before the Supreme Court the federal government took a uniform position through two administrations, with varying levels of enthusiasm. This pattern persists to the present day. All presidents since John F. Kennedy have supported the correctness of Brown, and
positions taken by the Department of Justice in court have echoed that
support. However, as is shown below, commitments to enforcement have
fluctuated, as have positions as to the operational details, sometimes lessening the extent to which the promise of Brown would be kept.
Although the executive branch had participated in Brown as amicus
curiae, Congress had bestowed no enforcement authority on the attorney
general. 18 The executive branch did take action to enforce the order to
desegregate the Little Rock, Arkansas, schools in the face of defiance by
Governor Faubus.' 9 Responding to acts of private violence against school
desegregation, Congress did make obstruction of federal court orders a
crime in 1960. 20 However, not until ten years after Brown did Congress
authorize a strong federal enforcement role: "Congress decided that the
time had come for a sweeping civil rights advance, including national legislation to speed up desegregation of public schools and to put teeth into
enforcement of desegregation. "21 From the outset the congressional authorization was hedged. It authorized the attorney general to bring school
desegregation suits, but only after receiving a meritorious complaint from
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a parent who is unable to maintain appropriate proceedings for relief and
only if the a ttorney general finds that "the institution of an action will
materially further the orderly achievement of desegregation in public education."22 Moreover, the Civil Rights Act of 1964 specified that it did not
empower any court or official to "issue any order seeking to achieve a
racial balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or
students from one school to ano ther or one school district to another in
order to achieve such racial balance." 23 It also authorized the federal government to provide technical assistance for desegregation and banned discrimination in federally assisted programs. The 1964 act thus signaled Congress's desire to bring de jure segregation to an end, but to keep the federal
government out of de facto segregation cases.
In the years that followed, the Department of Justice and the Department of Education (and its predecessor Department of Health, Education,
and Welfare [HEW]) did take vigorous steps on three fronts. First, they
contributed to the development of the legal standards governing desegregation. HEW promulgated guidelines for desegregation that laid the foundation for judging desegregation plans in terms of their success in actually
e liminating racial segregation . The Department of Justice participated as a
party or amicus in every Supreme Court school desegregation case and
many lower court cases. Second, the Departments of Justice and Health,
Education, and Welfare developed a joint strategy combining administrative enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 act with Justice Department litigation against large numbers of school systems. The Department of Justice
developed the statewide suit as a device for quickly obtaining desegregation decrees of general applicability. 24 The Education Section of the Justice
Department grew to over thirty attorneys by the mid-1970s. Third, the
Department of Education provided a substantial carrot to help school systems desegregate: federal financial assistance for desegregation. The Emergency School Assistance Act, as Orfield has told us, "helped hundreds of
districts in teacher train ing, human relations, and curriculum development work needed to make the transition from segregated to desegregated
schoo ls more effective."25
Although the federal government thus has done much to promote the
promise of Brown, the path has wavered. The definition of that promise was
advanced in the Department ofJustice amicus curiae brief in Green v. County
School Board.26 There the United States argued that "s<r<:alled 'freedom of
choice' plans satisfy the State's obligation only if they are part of a comprehensive program which actually achieves desegregation."27 The government
identified the continued existence of "all-Negro schools, attended by an
overwh elming majority of the Negro childre n " as the mark of an ineffective desegregation plan. Quoting the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, the
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United States argued: "Against the background of educational segregation
long maintained by law, the duty of school authorities is to accomplish 'the
conversion of a de jure segregated dual system to a unitary, nonracial
(nondiscriminatory) system-lock, stock, and barrel.' " 28 Further, "the
Fourteenth Amendment bars State action which unnecessarily creates
opportunities for the play of private prejudice." 29
The issue then arose whether the Court's approach in Green to desegregation of a rural county would apply as well to a densely populated urban
school system in which residential segregation prevailed. In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, the brief of the United States struck a
cautious note.!<) The brief did embrace Green, saying:
We think the right of school children articulated in Brown is to attend
school in a system where the school board exercises its decision-making powers so as to operate a non-racial unitary school system free
from discrimination, and that where this has not been done there is a
violation of the rights of such children requiring remedial adjustments
which give proper weight to that which is feasible and that which is
just. If choices exist which may have a racial impact, they cannot be
exercised in a racially neutral manner where to do so is to perpetuate
segregation. 5 1
Thus, the courts should "require that the governmental decisions affecting
racial segregation be so made and implemented, when feasible alternatives
are available, as to disestablish the dual system and eliminate its vestiges."' 2
However, echoing Congress's ambivalence on the matter, the United States
also concluded that "the Fourteenth Amendment does not require ...
racial balance in all public schools or integration of every all-white or allNegro school."'' Thus, contrary to the prior norm, the government's position in a school desegregation case diverged substantially but not wholly
from that of the black plaintiffs."
In the years that followed Swann the government has continued its
homage to Brown, while sometimes urging the Court to limit Brown's
applicability. Thus, on the one hand the government took the position that
metropolitanwide remedies could be ordered only where a metropolitan
violation has been found.' 5 On the other hand the government argued that
systemwide busing was appropriate in Columbus, Ohio, because the record
reflected a systemwide violation. The government argued that a unitary
school system is entitled to be released from a desegregation decree, while
agreeing that eliminating the vestiges of discrimination is a prerequisite to
a unitariness finding. 36 To some extent the fluctuations in the government's position have been due to political changes from one administration to the next. Thus, at the Brown Plus Thirty conference, the assistant
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attorney general for civil rights stressed cessation of busing and dissolution
of desegregation decrees as central themes of the government's program
for enforcing Brown. ~ This represents a change from the position of the
Carter administration and one may expect the Clinton administratio n to
reject these themes as well.
Two other changes diminished the role of the federal government in
enforcing Brown in the 1980s and continue to affect the federal role today.
First, the resources devoted to enforcement have been curtailed. Today,
the Civil Rights Division's section responsible for enforcing Brown employs
only thirteen attorneys. That shrunken crew is responsible not only for
hundreds of continuing court decrees requiring desegregation of e lementary and secondary education, but for higher education and sex and disabili ty discrimination as well . Similarly, in the Department of Education
today only 16 percent of the civil rights budget is spent on race discrimination issues. ~ Second, the Emergency School Assistance Act program was
essentially dismantled and its funds were diverted to general grants, which
need not be used for desegregation or heavily minority school districts. 39
In considering the future role of the federal government, one may
appropriately begin by asking what the successes and failures of Brown have
been. What has Brown accomplished? The structure of official racial segregation in schools has been dism antled, though vestiges remain. States that
once required segregation now have the most desegregated sch ools in the
nation. Brown served as impetus for integration of public facilities and public accommodations and for nondiscrimination laws governi n g voting,
housing, and employment. The official racial caste system is dead. Brown is
firmly entrenched in our jurisprudence and our national life and its repudiation would be virtually incon ceivable. There is massive consensus, on a
very general level, that racial discrimination and segregation are wrong
and that government should take steps to eradicate them. Thus, as Kenneth Clark has observed, Brown contributed "a simple, direct and eloquent
statement of a moral truth. "40
Set against these impressive gains is not so much failure as a shortfall in
terms of racial justice. Thus, some of th e gains under Brown are in danger
of erosion. T h e statistics already reflect a modest erosion, and the Supreme
Court's decision in Freeman v. Pitts" could lead additional school districts to
seek release from their desegregation obligations.<2 Moreover, Brown has
not brought to our children or society all the hoped-for benefits. "The generative power of Brown ... in the realm of equal educational opportunity,
has been limited primarily to its ban on racial segregation. Even there, the
refusal in Keyes to extend the ban to de facto segregation and the refusal in
Milliken to extend it to interdistrict racial imbalance further confined
Brown's reach." 43 We now know that law is an imperfect tool of educational
7

Brown Plus Forty

reform. Yet early resistance to Brown meant that too great an emphasis had
to be placed on litigation and too little on educational issues. This has led
to another type of criticism, which I believe is misplaced: "Brown's failure
.. . lay in its acceptance of a monolithic, color-blind society premised on
the continued supremacy of white cultural norms, without regard to the
role to be played by Mrican-American cultural norms. "« The fact is that
while Brown referred at one point to education 's role "in awakeni ng the
child to cultural values," neither the parties nor the Court had occasion to
address the issue of cultural norms. Nothing in Brown forecloses a claim of
discriminatory imposition of white cultural n orms. Finally, one's analysis
of whether Brown failed or succeeded depends on which possible meaning
of Brown one accepts. "If equal opportunity means the end of racial isolation and the achievement of equal funding or outputs, the Court long ago
gave a negative answer. ... If equal opportunity m eans freedom from
present intentional racial discrimination in the public schools, its future is
secure. If it also means freedom from the lingering effects of past discrimination , its future hangs in the balance. "••
What must be done for the future? We know from the m yth of a vengeful
and destructive Recon struction that factual distortion can undermine
responsible efforts to achieve racial justice. 46 A new m yth has arisen, that
busing is a failed and destructive remedy. As Orfield demonstrates in his
remarks in this issue, this too is a false and destructive myth. It is imperative that we not allow the constant drumbeat of the failure of school desegregation to go unanswered. The federal interest in the unity of the country
suggests that we should stress the bene fits of desegregation fo r all races
and for our society as a whole. A vigorous effort to retain the gains under
Brown must be mounted both in local communities and in the courts. The
federal government, especially the Departments of Justice and Education,
should join in that effort. They should renew the ca rrot-and-stick
approach: federal money to encourage voluntary desegregation and assistance to racially im pacted sch ool systems combined with more enforcement resources targeted on racial discrimination in elementary and secondary education. The cases leave open the question of whether a former
dual system that has become unitary has further obligations with respect to
neutralized but not eradicated effects of past discrimination. Stated in nonlegalistic terms, may such a system adopt assignment techniques that cause
r esegregation? The civil rights bar should continue to litigate that issue.
The Department of Justice should oppose resegregation. At the same time
it should stress flexibility and restraint as to desegregation techniques. Litigants should recognize, as we ll, that a remedy forged in the political
process is more like ly to succeed. We should not allow past difficulties to
e ntice us to renewed separatism. We must look to oth er measures to help
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with the goal of achieving racial justice and not rely solely on the equal
protection clause and nondiscrimination laws. Efforts to achieve economic
equity, fair housing, and educational excellence in all schools are essential
components in the quest for equal educational opportunity. Finally, we
must emphasize Brown 's "big tent" affirmation of the Declaration of Independence and the Fourteenth Amendment and thereby maintain the public and legal support for the core values of Brown. 41 We should experiment
within the confines of those core values and abjure solutions outside those
confines. We should remember that compliance with Brown is a necessary
condition for e qual education, but it is not alone a sufficient condition to
ensure equality.
After forty years, the regime of Brown has not brought about equal educational opportunity. Many one-r ace schools remain. Even where schools
are integrated, inequalities remain. School finances are unequal. Graduation rates are unequal. Othe r inequalities persist. Do these facts indict
Brown? Or do they signify that the magnitude of the task is greater than we
thought in 1954? Should we give up on Brown's promise? The question
calls to mind that several milJennia have passed since we received the Ten
Commandments. "Thou shalt not kill" remains a worthy aspiration. I
believe the aspirations of Brown are similarly correct, an d that our task is to
rededicate our efforts-which have flagged in recent years-to achieve
e qual educational opportunity. The federa l government's role in those
efforts is as impo rtant as ever and should also be rededicated.
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